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Abstract: This paper explores the role of planning in the deeply divided and 
politically polarized context of Jerusalem. The overall argument developed 
throughout the paper is that the “planning/politics nexus” is a non-hierarchical 
set of interactions, negotiated within a specific historical, geographical, legal and 
cultural contexts – in other words, orders don’t come down from the politicians 
to be slavishly followed by planners. In this respect, our findings, based on in-
depth interviews with Israeli planners, suggest that the case of Jerusalem 
represents a particularly dramatic illustration of the fact that the function of 
planning expertise can only be understood in relation to the surrounding socio-
political environment. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, planners 
in Jerusalem are not destined to either complicity or irrelevance in the face of 
political imperatives; planners’ agency, however, does not simply reflect their 
mastery of a specific set professional knowledge and tools but also their ability 
to act strategically in relation to the context in which they operate. 
 
Keywords: Planning conflicts; urban geopolitics; contested cities; Jerusalem;  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
How do planners operating in a contested city make sense of the polarized 
environment in which the planning system functions? How do they reconcile 
their role as professionals with the existence of partisan policy goals and harsh 
power asymmetries? And to what extent can planners have an impact in such 
deeply polarized context – where, the argument goes, planning is subordinated 
to political considerations? This paper tries to answer these questions about the 
relation between planning and politics – what we can term the “planning/politics 
nexus” – through an exploration of the experience of Israeli planners in the city 
of Jerusalem. The overall argument developed throughout the paper is that an 
appreciation of the contextual nature of planning practices is crucial to further 
our understanding of the planning/politics nexus as a non-hierarchical set of 
interactions, negotiated within historical, geographical, legal and cultural 
contexts – and, specifically, to make sense of the agency of Israeli planners in 
relation to the entanglement of planning and political issues in Jerusalem.  
Our study of Jerusalem offers two distinct but interrelated insights. First, 
it reminds us in a particularly dramatic way that urban planning issues are more 
broadly political and social issues. This does not only mean that planners face 
concerns that go beyond the narrow limits of their professional training or the 
responsibilities inherent to their institutional role; crucially, it also means that 
the function of planning expertise can only be assessed in relation to the socio-
political environment in which the planning system operates. Second, we argue 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, planning in Jerusalem is not destined to 
either complicity or irrelevance in the face of political imperatives. Planners do 
have agency, but any assessment of this agency depends on the 
acknowledgement that it is impossible to draw a neat or arbitrary boundary 
Page 1 of 23
Peer Review Copy
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
between ”planning” and “politics”. Planners’ contribution to the policy process 
does not simply reflect their mastery of a specific professional knowledge and 
set of tools, but also their ability to act strategically in relation to the context in 
which they operate; at the same time, there is a reciprocal influence between the 
dynamics of the planning process and the surrounding socio-political 
environment. 
The bulk of the empirical material for this study is constituted by in-depth 
interviews with Israeli planners. The first section of the paper illustrates the 
theoretical background of the analysis, especially in relation to wider debates in 
planning theory. In the second section, we briefly introduce the reader to the 
environment of Jerusalem, in order to present the structural challenges to 
planners’ actions in the context of a contested city. The third section of the paper 
describes the experience of planners with respect to the polarization of the 
urban environment, and their personal and professional strategies to cope with 
the challenges inherent to this situation. In the final section we offer a few 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Power/Planning Nexus  
 
The relation between planning and politics has been central to the debate in 
planning theory for decades. At least since the early 1990s, this debate has 
largely developed as a reaction to the success of the “communicative” or 
“collaborative” approaches to planning. Drawing on Jurgen Habermas’ work on 
deliberative rationality (Habermas, 1979, 1989, 1990) and on Anthony Giddens’ 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), scholars such as John Forrester, Patsy 
Healey and Judith Innes have focused on the mechanics of discursive and 
deliberative practices, and on the achievement of consensus amongst 
participants in order to remove imbalances and negative effects of power 
asymmetries in the planning process (Forester, 1982, 1988; Healey, 1992; 
Forester, 1993; Innes, 1995; Healey, 1996, 1997; Forester, 1999, 2009) – see 
Healey (2012) for a review). Their critics, in turn, have challenged the 
Habermasian/Giddensian roots of communicative theory by referring especially 
to the work of Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1983, 1984) and Chantal Mouffe 
(Mouffe, 1999, 2000, 2005). 
The theory of communicative planning (itself a wide a diverse body of 
literature) has become the testing ground for debating a number of crucial issues 
for social sciences as a whole. Critics of communicative planning have debated 
the ontological foundations of (democratic) planning praxis (Bond, 2011; 
Gualini, 2015) as part of a wider argument on alternative conceptions of 
democratic politics (Flyvbjerg, 1998a; Purcell, 2008; Hilary Silver et al., 2010); 
models of rationality underlying different streams of planning theory and their 
analytical and normative goals have also been subjected to debate (Flyvbjerg, 
1996, 1998b; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002); as have the relations between 
process and context (Lauria & Whelan, 1995; Fainstein, 2000; Yiftachel & Huxley, 
2000b; Fainstein, 2010) and the dialectic between analytical and normative 
ambitions of planning theory (Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000a, 2000c). Further critical 
discussions have taken place around the relation between the theoretical corpus 
of communicative scholarship and actual experiences of planning practices and 
processes (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998) and the emancipatory, 
Page 2 of 23
Peer Review Copy
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
progressive potential often attributed to planning practices (Flyvbjerg, 1996; 
Yiftachel, 1998; Porter, 2010: 125-150). And in general, the theoretical status 
and ambitions of the body of work of communicative scholars has been 
examined in the light of other approaches to planning theory, urban studies and 
political geography (Huxley & Yiftachel, 1998; Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000b). The 
debate has remained lively and, to a certain extent, polarizing, to the point that 
some scholars conclude that “[p]lanning theory seems to have become a set of 
dividing discourses” (Innes & Booher, 2014: 196). Despite some efforts to bridge 
the gap (Hillier, 2002; Bond, 2011), the existence of unresolved ontological, 
epistemological and normative tensions seem to suggest that it would be naïve to 
think that a comprehensive synthesis between the different positions can be 
found. 
The debates we have alluded to, however, can serve as a background to 
illustrate and clarify the purposes of this paper which, first and foremost, is an 
attempt to offer an empirically-grounded characterization of the 
planning/politics nexus in Jerusalem. We maintain nevertheless, that our 
emphasis on the situated nature of planning practices can provide some more 
general insights in this respect, and suggest ways in which the gap between 
communicative theorists and their critics can be narrowed and, most 
importantly, re-interpreted in an analytically productive fashion. 
 
 
Broadly speaking, it has been suggested that considering temporal and 
spatial context of planning intervention (and, more generally, of urban policies) 
can blur the differences between dichotomies in understandings of the 
Habermas/Foucault divide in relation to urban democracy and planning 
practices (Pugh, 2005; Beaumont & Loopmans, 2008; Silver et al., 2010; Bond, 
2011). In particular,  
 
distinctions between consensus and conflict, top down and bottom up, do not 
constitute mutually exclusive categories. […] Rather than propose a compromise 
or ‘hybrid’ type of democracy […] or simply view contestation and consensus as 
mutually exclusive alternatives, we see opposing normative conceptions of 
democracy as different ‘moments’ in the democratic process (Silver et al., 2010: 
454). 
 
 On the other side, since the beginning of the 1990s, social sciences have 
abandoned the long-held positivistic notion of expertise as neutral, rational and 
ready-made resource, in favour of the so-called “argumentative” turn of policy 
enquiry (Hoppe 1999). Also thanks to the key contributions by communicative 
theorists (Fischer and Forester 1993) planning professionals are today largely 
seen as belonging to the category that Frank Fischer defines of “post-empiricist 
experts”, as mediators “operating between the available analytic frameworks of 
social science, particular policy findings, and the differing perspectives of the 
public actors” (Fischer 2009: 11). At the same time, while many communicative 
theorists (e.g. Forester 1999, 2009; Fischer 2009) have analysed the role of 
experts with the aim of defining a set of good professional practices, both their 
critics (Flyvbjerg, 1996, 1998b) and scholars belonging to the same 
argumentative/deliberative tradition (Wagenaar, 2004) have pointed out that 
experts commonly resort to practical judgments, coalition-building, lobbying and 
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political activism – in short, how they make a strategic use of their professional 
knowledge and status to steer the policy process. 
Our emphasis is on conceiving planning as a relational and non-
hierarchical set of interactions and negotiations builds on these suggestions in 
two ways: through broad argument about the debate in planning theory; and in 
two propositions derived from our research on Jerusalem. 
First, we suggest that in many cases the rift between communicative 
scholars and their critics can be productively reformulated in terms of their 
emphasis on two different contexts or moments in which the relation between 
planning and politics is played out. Communicative scholars largely focus on the 
“politics in planning” (i.e. on how issues of power, conflict play a role in the 
planning process) and place their emphasis (sometimes with strong normative 
undertones) on the role of the deliberative practitioner in this context. Their 
critics focus instead on the “politics of planning” (i.e. on the broader social and 
political structures in which the planning processes take place) with the 
ambition of developing the analytical task of examining aspects of planning 
policies and practices that can be seen to operate as forms of ‘socio-spatial 
engineering’.1 
While this distinction remains meaningful in many ways, we maintain 
that both dimensions are relevant to further our understanding of the relation 
between planning and politics. Indeed, while the critics of communicative theory 
have correctly noted how a purely procedural approach to planning obscures the 
decisive influence of the surrounding socio-political environment on the 
dynamics of the planning process, communicative scholars have not been totally 
blind to this dynamic (see for example (Healey, 2006, 2013). Healey (2003), in 
particular, has argued that the communicative emphasis on ethnographic 
accounts of planning practices can be justified in the light of the fact that 
“innovations are occurring all the time in the fine grain. In certain circumstances, 
these have the potential to challenge the driving forces to which local initiatives 
find themselves subject” (Healey, 2003: 109) – a position that echoes the notion 
of “insurgency” (Holston, 2008) and the call to learn from “marginalized” local 
voices to enrich planning theory and practice (Sandercock, 1998). The need to 
consider both the external and internal dynamics of the power/planning nexus 
experienced by planners in Jerusalem is critical to grasp the full complexity of 
their agency. 
Second, we argue that Jerusalem is both an “extreme” and a “critical” case 
of the planning/politics nexus. It is an “extreme case” – i.e. a case that makes a 
point in “an especially dramatic way” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229) – because it 
emphasizes the importance of taking into account the dynamics of the local 
power relations in the planning process. Observing planners in Jerusalem makes 
clear, not only that the socio-political context constitutes a structure of 
constraints and opportunities for planners’ agency, but that the very definition of 
what constitutes “good planning practices” depends on this context.  Indeed, the 
consensus on the very idea of “good planning practices” is more apparent than 
real among planners in Jerusalem; ultimately, ideals of “good planning” do not 
represent abstract commentaries on the role of planning but rather 
                                                        
1
 This tension is vividly expressed in the exchange between John Forester (2000), Patsy Healey (2000) 
and Oren Yiftachel and Margo Huxley (2000a), published in 2000 in the International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research. 
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manifestations of specific (and not necessarily consensual) forms of contingent, 
limited rationality (what Flyvbjerg defines in terms of realrationalität, Flyvbjerg, 
1996). Jerusalem also represents a “critical case” – i.e. a case intended to 
“achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type, “If this is (not) 
valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 307) – with 
respect to planners’ agency. In other words, if we are able to demonstrate that 
planners do have an influence on urban issues in Jerusalem – where, it is widely 
assumed, planning is subordinated to politics – then this holds true, a fortiori, for 
less polarized urban contexts. Having said that Jerusalem contains extreme 
power dynamics with the potential, of theoretically linking diverging planning 
discourses, we now move on to how the geopolitical realty has shaped planning 
in the city.  
 
3. Jerusalem – planning and urban geopolitics in a contested city   
 
The partisan nature of planning in Jerusalem is widely recognized – and indeed, 
the city is firmly placed in the literature on “contested” cities (Kliot & Mansfeld, 
1999; Kotek, 1999; Bollens, 2000; Anderson, 2008; Rosen & Shlay, 2010; H. 
Silver, 2010; Calame & Charlesworth, 2011; Rosen & Shlay, 2014) – see Allegra et 
al (2012) for a review. In Jerusalem, past and continuing conflicts between 
Israelis and Palestinians have created a situation where the very existence of the 
system of governance is contested by large part of the population, and where the 
planning system as a whole lack widespread legitimacy but instead, plays a 
major role in exacerbating spatial and social division. The scholarly literature has 
produced countless accounts of the asymmetries inherent in Israeli planning 
policies in the city (For some recent examples, see: Dumper 2014; Shlay & Rosen 
2015). It is not our intention to list and describe the many episodes and facets of 
the politicization of planning in Jerusalem: however, in order to relate our 
exploration of planning practices to their contents, context and scale, we will 
attempt in this section, to understand how this extreme urban geopolitical 
condition created a set of opportunities and constraints for Israeli planners. 
Since the reunification of the city in 1967, territorial and demographic 
concerns over the status of Jerusalem have been paramount in determining 
planning decisions. After the 1967 war, the Israeli government expanded the 
municipal boundaries of Jerusalem to include 71 km2 of the West Bank. The new 
boundaries were traced following the principle “a maximum of land with a 
minimum of Arabs” (Benvenisti 1995: 53) – i.e. to allow the city to expand on a 
metropolitan scale through the annexation of vast traits of empty land beyond 
the narrow (6.5 km2) limits of the Jordanian municipality of Jerusalem, while at 
the same time leaving outside the city limits densely-inhabited Palestinian 
suburbs such as Abu Dis and el-Eizariya. The expansion of the municipal 
boundaries represented an administrative fact on the ground intended to 
foreclose the possibility of a future territorial compromise being forced on 
Jerusalem.  This also dictated the choice of the “dispersed” model of urban 
development favoured by the government and the Ministry of Housing, which 
aimed at the rapid mobilization of resources to build the so-called “new 
neighbourhoods” of Jerusalem on green-field sites (French Hill, Gilo, Ramot Neve 
Ya’akov, East Talpiot and Pisgat Ze’ev). The dispersed model was preferred to 
the “compact” city model, which had been advanced in the informal Master Plan 
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for possible future reunification of the city, drafted by municipal planners in the 
years before 1967 (Schweid, 1986; Faludi, 1997).  
The same underlying principle (to establish a large, unified city with a 
dominant Jewish majority) continued to guide Israel’s planning policy in the 
following decades, resulting not only in a marked gap between communities in 
terms of housing, services provision and infrastructure investments, but in a 
chaotic expansion of the urban fabric – indeed, no comprehensive plan for the 
city of Jerusalem has been legally approved since 1959. The most recent 
proposal for a new Outline Plan, the “Jerusalem Master Plan 2000” (JMPD, 2004), 
explicitly emphasized the need to maintain a Jewish majority in the city, 
expressed in terms of a population objective of 60% Jewish to 40% Palestinian – 
in itself a shift from the original, post-1967 70%-30% ratio. In order to maintain 
this ratio, the plan allocated a limited amount of land for the expansion of 
Palestinian neighbourhoods. Still, even this relatively modest increase proved to 
be controversial. The Master Plan 2000 was presented in an initial version in 
2004, and was eventually approved for deposit in 2007. However, the Israeli 
Minister of Interior effectively froze the plan, claiming it discriminated against 
the Israeli population in favour of the Palestinian (Rokem, 2013: 9). 
Consequently, as Faludi notes, Israeli planning authorities have operated 
in Jerusalem with a strong sense of purpose, but without adopting a formal or 
explicit planning doctrine (Faludi, 1997: 83). Echoing Faludi’s remarks, a senior 
planner at JIIS (formerly Policy Director of the Jerusalem Municipality Planning 
Department) observes:  
 
Jerusalem grew during the last forty years, not in a systematic way as towns are 
growing, gradually from one point to another; it was jumping to the edge of the 
boundaries of the boundaries […]. If it was to remain to the planners, they 
probably would not decide to [build] in the south Gilo somewhere, but to grow 
[the city] gradually, step by step, towards that. [F,  interview, November 2010] 
 
In the same vein, a senior city planner of the Jewish settlement of Ma’ale 
Adumim (a dormitory town of about 40,000 residents located about 7 km east of 
the Old City of Jerusalem) comments:  
 
 I think that Jerusalem lacks a lot in planning: it does not have a general view. 
After 1967, the Ministry of Housing and the government tried to achieve certain 
political goals in Jerusalem […]. I don’t think that there was a really [much 
thought] about […] how this town will function [K, interview, November 2010] 
 
 The examination of the planning system at the metropolitan scale – where 
the demographic weight of the Palestinian community is larger than in the 
municipality of Jerusalem (see Allegra 2013: 504-6) – offers an even better 
illustration of the distortions placed on the statutory tools for urban and regional 
planning. The metropolitan area of the city is by and large a functional urban 
region, (despite the existence of severe limitations to Palestinian freedom of 
movement), however, this region is effectively split in two halves in 
jurisdictional and administrative terms. The first is represented by the Israeli 
Jerusalem District and the second by the Israeli Civil Administration. The 
Jerusalem District is an administrative planning region including the Jerusalem 
municipality and the area that lies westward. Planning in this area is under the 
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responsibility of the Jerusalem District Planning Committee and falls under the 
provision of the current statutory plan for the district (TAMAM30/1, 2013) – 
(Figure . 1). 
 
- INSERT HERE-  
 
Figure 1: Greater Jerusalem Map*, reproducing the Jerusalem Regional 
TAMAM 30/1 Masterplan and Ma’ale Adumim Masterplan.  
 
 Much of the functional region of the city, however, lies outside the 
Jerusalem District boundaries on the east side of the 1967 “Green Line”. The area 
lying north, east and west of the municipality of Jerusalem is placed under the 
supervision of the Civil Administration, a division of the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence in charge of the administration of the West Bank. Its planning system 
functions on the basis of the pre-1967 Jordanian law, as amended by the orders 
of the Israeli military authorities. In this area we find a number of Palestinian 
and Jewish communities, including a few relatively large urban centres such as 
Ramallah, Bethlehem, Givat Ze’ev and Ma’ale Adumim. Further elements 
contributed over time to the fragmentation and the stratification of the planning 
system including in particular the implementation of the Oslo agreements which 
introduced at least four main different governance models operating on an 
archipelago of separate administrative areas in the West Bank); and the 
construction of the so-called “separation barrier” started in 2003. 
The areas of the West Bank under the authority of the Israeli Civil 
Administration enjoy a differentiated degree of informal integration into the 
Israeli planning system. Planning schemes for large Jewish settlements such as 
Ma’ale Adumim are largely – albeit informally – part of a metropolitan 
understanding of a Jewish “Greater Jerusalem”. Planning documents, such as for 
example, the 2006 Ma'ale Adumim regional Master Plan (Figure. 1), make it clear 
that Israeli planning for the actual Jerusalem functional region is not limited to 
the territorial scope of Jerusalem District plans such as the TAMAM 30/1.  
This fundamental ambiguity is implicitly acknowledged by the recent 
emergence of planning concepts that seek to operationalize the political notion 
of “Greater Jerusalem”. Since 2009, for example, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel 
Studies (the quasi-official municipal research institute on planning issues in 
Jerusalem) has added to its yearly Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook a section 
presenting data on the so-called “Jerusalem Region”, which includes the 
municipality of Jerusalem and its Jewish hinterland on both sides of the “Green 
Line”, while at the same time excluding Palestinian localities in the West Bank 
(Choshen & Korach, 2014: 95; JIIS, 2014). As one of the Institute planners 
remarked, JIIS consciously decided not to publish data on the Palestinian 
population in the metropolitan area [J, interview, February 2010]. 
The constraints placed by political imperatives on the development of the 
urban fabric are most evident in the field of housing policies – a critical policy 
sector for the maintenance of an “appropriate” demographic balance between 
the two communities. Distortions in data collection such as those underlying the 
concept of a “Jerusalem Region” reflect Israeli concerns for the ‘worsening’ 
demographic balance with the Palestinian population both within and outside 
the municipal boundaries of the city. At the end of 2013, the population of the 
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municipality of Jerusalem numbered 829,900. The Jewish population was 
509,600 (61.4%), while there were 320,300 non-Jewish residents (38.6%) (CBS, 
2013). By not considering Palestinian localities in the West Bank, the JIIS’ 
Jerusalem Region incorporates an additional 495,000 Jewish residents, but only 
6,500 Palestinians (i.e. the residents of Abu Gosh, an Arab Israeli village located 
10 km west of Jerusalem). This is clearly an optical illusion: estimates roughly 
based on the territorial notion of a Jerusalem Region showed that when 
Palestinian localities are included, the population of the area is about two million 
people (with a slight majority of Palestinian residents) (Allegra, 2013: 504-506), 
distributed along two axis crossing in Jerusalem – what Noam Shoval (Shoval, 
2007: 96) calls the “Metropolitan X”: a Palestinian north-south axis stretching 
from Ramallah to Bethlehem, and an Israeli east-west axis stretching between 
Ma’ale Adumim and Modi’in. Our analysis has presented so far the multifaceted 
geopolitical constraints; in next sections we will focus on how the planners deals 
with the implication of working within such a complex reality.  
 
 
4. Planning in turbulent times  
 
In this section we discuss Israeli planners’ perception of the planning/politics 
nexus and their strategies and agency in relation to urban issues. A few 
considerations are in order before going further. Our discussion is mainly based 
on interviews realized with Israeli and Palestinian planners between 2010 and 
2013. While our original focus was on substantive urban issues, our engagement 
with our respondents and the empirical material has pushed us to explore the 
subjectivity and the agency of planners themselves. Methodologically, the 
organization of fieldwork and interpretation of the data followed the same 
inductive pattern, through coding, memo writing and theoretical sampling. 
The discussion presented in this paper is based on selected interviews 
with Israeli planners (including two Palestinians with Israeli nationality); we 
decided to focus on Israeli planners because in Jerusalem substantial constraints 
are placed on the participation of non-Israelis (i.e. on Palestinian planners 
without Israeli nationality) in the planning process and on political mobilization 
in general. In consideration of this fact – and of the limited space available to 
develop our analysis – we chose to discuss a restricted but more homogeneous 
group of respondents. Our respondents work(ed) either in municipal and 
governmental administrative offices and bodies, or in human rights-oriented 
NGOs (such as Bimkom, Peace Now, BT’selem, Ir Amim, and others – see 
Appendix). 
To frame our discussion, we will refer to these two categories as 
“mainstream” and “activist” planners respectively. Even in the polarized 
environment of Jerusalem, however, the two categories cannot be neatly 
separated: “mainstream” planners sometimes become stern critics of the same 
policies they have contributed to implementing, or they refrain from making 
career choices that would require them to work in specific areas or fields. 
Similarly, “activist” planners work in West Jerusalem with the same municipal 
officers whose policies in East Jerusalem they criticize. And in each case, 
criticism  (and endorsement) of Israeli official policies varies in degree and 
nature. Retrospectively, however, we found that this distinction tends to reflect 
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the existence of different narratives about planning developed by the two 
groups. 
 
The impact of politics on urban planning issues 
 
How do planners in Jerusalem see the planning/politics nexus? On the surface, a 
rather striking unanimity seems to characterize the local planning community. 
Jerusalemite planners seem to be perfectly conscious of the deep politicization of 
urban issues; everyone can mention episodes in which planners have “lost” the 
battle to politicians, or in which the lack of proper planning and the distortions 
of statutory and developmental tools negatively affected the local community. 
The professionals working in the various branches of Israeli 
administration – who we have called “mainstream” planners – are almost 
unanimous in lamenting the absence in Jerusalem of what Faludi (1997) would 
consider an explicit  “planning doctrine”. After 1967, crucial decisions on the 
future development of the city were “imposed on the planners to handle […] The 
major decisions are political decisions and the planners have to cope with it” [F, 
interview, November 2010]. This is further reflected in an interview with the 
current Director of the Jerusalem Municipality Planning Department voicing his 
opinion about the option of promoting plans in Jerusalem’s Palestinian areas; 
“[w]hat are my chances of moving the plan forward in the current Municipality? 
[…] not great”: because of the “lack of political interest” on the part of the 
municipality [A, interview, May 2013]. Activist planners know only too well the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to plan in Palestinian neighbourhoods, and 
they certainly agree about the impact of the entrenched politicization of the 
planning system. Indeed, a large part of the activity of organizations such as 
Bimkom, Peace Now, BT’selem, and Ir Amim consists of denouncing the 
distortions of local planning policies and in monitoring their (negative) results 
on the local community (see e.g. (Cohen-Bar & Kronish, 2013; El-Atrash, 2015).  
Similarly, on the surface planners seem to share the idea that the 
adherence to set of “good planning practices” constitutes an essential 
requirement for implementing meaningful and effective planning intervention in 
the city. NGOs involved in planning initiatives seem to invariably adopt 
participative and deliberative practices in their modus operandi  (Bimkom, 2006; 
Rokem et al., 2009; El-Atrash, 2015), but even mainstream planning institutions 
seem to have adopted the now-standard references to participatory practices, 
multi-disciplinarity and multiculturalism as the base for a comprehensive 
approach to urban issues and the creation of a positive relations with the 
stakeholders in general. This is reflected for example in the passage, quoted by a 
study conducted by the JIIS in 2010 on the Kidron Valley (a North-South strip 
separating the Old City from the Mount of Olives): 
 
a strong emphasis was placed on involving [Palestinian] residents of the area the 
process. The researchers met with representatives of the residents of all the 
neighborhoods included in the research area […]. The multidisciplinary team included 
researchers and planners from numerous fields, including Arab researchers who are 
thoroughly familiar with the area. We owe the latter particular thanks for enabling the 
entire team to gain a closer acquaintance with the living conditions and physical state of 
the neighborhoods […]. (Kimhi, 2010) 
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Such unanimity, however, is more apparent than real. If all the planners in 
Jerusalem concur on the politicization of planning, their interpretations of the 
planning/politics nexus diverge radically, largely reflecting a 
“mainstream”/”activist” divide. Mainstream planners tend to see the relation 
between planning and politics in antagonistic terms: political obstacles 
constitute a burden imposed by the conflict as a whole on the metropolitan area 
– and on their efforts as professionals. Indeed, many planners seem to believe 
that a structural incompatibility exists between planning and politics. By 
creating balanced development schemes, planning would irremediably conflict 
with the political process by setting preconditions to the negotiations [N, 
interview, November 2010; see also Bollens, 2000: 153-4]. The ubiquitous 
politicization of urban issues would therefore represent the antithesis of the 
positive atmosphere required for productive planning discussions. As a senior 
planner in the Jerusalem municipality notes, in explaining the lack of 
development in Palestinian areas, 
   
When you negotiate with the Arab sector there is a clear difference in perception and it's 
much harder to reach a solution […]. [T]hey don’t agree even when you reach a solution 
for 90 percent of the houses becoming part of the plan and another 10 percent illegally 
built having to be demolished. It's a 100 percent win-win solution or nothing [B, 
interview, June 2013]. 
 
The politics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict also creates distortions in the 
agenda of urban development. One of our respondents, elaborating on the 
“conflict between urban goals and government goals” notes how,  
 
[e]very time a developer wants to develop something in the city center […] [the 
municipality] would tell him to develop their residences [for the Jewish population]. 
Why? Because they want to keep the demographic balance. Residences, residence, 
residences… and then the city center is not functioning because every time they develop 
residences instead of services, arts, museums, employment, as it should be. [J, interview, 
February 2010]. 
 
This antagonistic understanding of the planning/politics nexus is founded 
on the idea that planning and political considerations are separable. Indeed, in 
an effort to come to terms with the partisan nature of planning policies in 
Jerusalem – and, sometimes, to minimize their own involvement in political 
controversies – many of the mainstream planners seem to adopt the strategy 
described by Morley and Shachar (Morley & Shachar, 1986: 45), namely, to base 
their activity on a discourse that emphasizes the technical and ultimately 
objective nature of planning knowledge and methodologies. 
This strategy is enacted by creating multiple layers of professional and 
institutional boundaries that separate their activity from the surrounding 
political context, which ultimately create and maintain a “safe space” for the 
planner to act in conformity with his or her professional training and ethics. A 
first layer consists of a “psychological separation of an administrative ‘me’ from a 
political ‘them’” (Bollens, 2000: 109). While our respondents often 
spontaneously declared their political preferences – usually in a convoluted 
manner (e.g. “I am not known as a very right-wing - on the contrary” [F, 
interview, November 2010]), they did so only to immediately distance 
themselves from the entanglements of politics by unequivocally stating their 
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adherence to professional and ethical standards. Indeed, our respondents 
regularly emphasized their strictly professional role in the planning process: as 
one of them put it, “I am not a politician […]. The attitude of this office is very 
professional; we are not into political issues” [E, interview, November 2010]. 
Some of the respondents articulated this separation by referring to the different 
stages of the planning process: planners begin their work after politicians have 
already created the set of opportunities and constraints for the former to act, so 
that what’s left for the planners in many cases is to make sure that political 
deliberations are translated on the ground in a professional way. For others, 
planners and politicians belong to separate species altogether –some of our 
respondents went so far to imply that an agreement about major planning 
decisions among members of the planning community would be relatively easy 
to reach, irrespectively of their political views or ethnic background [D, 
interview, November 2010]. 
The second layer of separation between politics and planning is provided 
by the methodological apparatus that makes up the planning profession: a code 
of conduct and a set of technical tools that would enable the avoidance of 
political debates on issues such as sovereignty and self-determination, 
democracy and human rights, and instead allow a focus on the apparently ‘non-
political’ issues inherent to the daily life of individuals and communities in the 
city. Many planners seem to believe that, at least to a certain extent, the use of 
specific planning instruments – such as the “potential model” of placing 
infrastructures to serve both communities in areas where the potential for 
conflict is highest [E, F, M, interviews, November 2010; see also Bollens, 2000: 
148] – would allow bypassing political issues and even have an inherent value in 
terms of conflict management. Reference to methodology, technical tools and 
professional standards is deemed to provide planners with a separate space, a 
space where they can deal with contentious issues as purely urban issues, and 
where professional expertise can be deployed in a relatively uncontroversial 
way. Or, to put it differently, whatever the (lamentable) political situation, the 
stakeholders can achieve tangible benefit from the use of the planners’ 
professional toolbox.  A planner at JIIS expresses this concept as follows: 
 
I am speaking about the basic urban level of services, employment, 
transportation. […]. I think that the basis for a joint life does not have to include 
any political restructuring. [...] I think that things can advance even without any 
change of political framework. I know that the facts in the last forty years are 
against what I am saying, but I think that [there have been some advances] [J, 
interview, February 2010]. 
 
The logic of “incompatibility” between planning and politics enunciated 
by mainstream planners is turned upside down by activist planners. While they 
also express their frustration in confronting the urban reality of Jerusalem, they 
see the distortions of urban development not as the unfortunate consequence of 
the prevalence of political considerations, but rather the direct consequence of 
the partisan nature of the local planning system – from the ethno-national, 
demographic imperatives informing planning decisions to the collusion between 
politicians, government officials and the Jewish settlers. The impossibility of 
addressing pressing urban issues does not depend on political constraints placed 
on professional planning practice, but rather on the overall coherence between 
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planning and politics, and on the consensus among politicians, bureaucrats and 
professionals about the fundamental goals and principles of urban policy [I, L, 
interviews, February 2010; see also (Kaminker, 1997)]. Hence, the main source 
of frustration for activist planners is not the feeling that political factors limit 
their role as professionals: instead they perceive themselves as waging a struggle 
against the whole planning system – a struggle in which “counter-planning” 
activities require huge efforts but only bring about minimal results. 
In a more subtle way, the ambiguous and artificial separation between 
planning and politics is widely perceived by “activist” planners as an effective 
rhetorical tool to avoid debating pressing urban issues and prevent the 
submission of planning objections or filing petitions to courts:  
 
The planners in the offices, they say, ”This is politics, don’t talk to us here in this 
committee about politics, we are talking about planning” [I, interview, February 2010].  
 
I am not very optimistic about [going to courts] […]. For example, the petition against E-1 
[an area between the city of Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim; Israeli 
development plans for the area are widely seen by the Palestinians and international 
community a the ultimate threat to two state solution - see Allegra (2014)] in 1998 was 
rejected on the ground that [it was] a general petition that deals with issues that are 
primarily political in nature. Now, you can argue this [about almost] everything in the 
West Bank, so that’s why we actually to avoid as much as possible anything that can hit 
on a political argumentation... But still, if they want they can always say it [G, interview, 
February 2010]. 
 
In this context, political considerations are a crucial factor for the 
evaluation of planners’ roles in Jerusalem. Mainstream planners’ arguments 
about their effort to defend their neutrality through commitment to professional 
standards to maintain a balanced role in dealing with urban issues is widely 
considered by activists as an attempt at self-deception, or worse, as a rhetorical 
device designed to hide their complicity with the system 
 
Planners want to get jobs. They are part of the political system, of the power relationship 
[…]. There are very few planners who refuse to plan in the occupied territories, most of 
them hide behind that excuse, “We are trying to be [neutral]”. The fact that you [make] 
that plan is political… otherwise you should refuse. If you don’t refuse, you become part 
of the process [C, interview, November 2010]. 
 
Some of our respondents abandoned their work in the Israeli planning 
offices at some point, precisely because of their uneasiness with the political 
environment and the overall direction of municipal policies [C, H, interviews, 
November 2010, February 2010]. Commenting on her past positions in the 
planning administration, one of them concluded that she no longer felt 
comfortable representing the municipal administration, and this motivated her 
decision to work as a freelance, with the possibility of selecting projects that 
harmonized with her political views [O, interview, May 2012]. Similarly, another 
prominent figure in the Jerusalem planning establishment who had “opted out” 
for political reasons was Sarah Kaminker (see Forester et al., 2001: 115-38).  
 
The same considerations on the position of the planner vis-à-vis the 
political system are part of an ongoing debate among activist planners about the 
possibility of “working the system”.  
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From the start we had an internal debate [about whether] we should actively engage in 
the planning process or remain an outside critical voice opposing unjust planning and 
violation of human rights. […] When we actively plan, we become part of the disease and 
can't take a more external critical position [I, interview, July 2012].     
 
Ultimately, the controversy surrounds the very meaning of planning 
practices. Contrary to the largely procedural (if sometime participative), neutral 
approach enunciated by mainstream planners, for activists, professional 
techniques and methodologies have a less straightforward role in the planning 
process. In the report on the Kaminker Project – a deliberative planning initiative 
carried out by the Israeli NGO Bimkom in the Palestinian neighbourhood of 
Isawiya – this double role is clearly enunciated: on one hand, the document 
states that in Jerusalem “all too often political and economic interests drive 
planning decisions” while “[t]he planning decisions of the Kaminker team were 
based […] on objective planning criteria, namely, the needs and constraints of 
Issawiya residents”; on the other hand, Bimkom’s planning intervention in 
Isawiya had an inherent, broader political goal, aiming to serve “as a tool to 
foster equality and promote co-existence between Arab and Jewish populations” 
(Bimkom, 2006: 4). 
 
“Good planning practices” and the contextual nature of planners’ agency 
 
The quotes above introduce the second crucial theme of this paper. How 
is it possible for planners in Jerusalem to have an impact on urban issues? Do 
planners have any agency at all in the contested city of Jerusalem? And what is 
the role of the adherence to a set of “good planning practices” in this respect?  
The starting point of our discussion is the conventional wisdom that in 
Jerusalem planning plays a largely subordinate role; in other words, planning in 
Jerusalem is either irrelevant (because political considerations, rather than 
planning arguments and models, dictate the development in the city) or purely 
instrumental in the face of politics (i.e. that planning is simply “war carried out 
by other means”: (Coon, 1992: 210) – the argument echoes the position of some 
post-colonial theorists (Porter, 2010) which consider planning as inherently 
geared toward the exclusion and dispossession of the colonized. It is certainly 
not our intention to deny the partisan nature of the planning interventions that 
have marked Jerusalem’s urban development under Israeli rule in the last 
decades: the growth of the city and the structure of the planning system have 
been profoundly affected by the lack of representation of Palestinian population 
and the partisan nature of Israeli policies. From this point of view, the case of 
Jerusalem has often been cited to support the view that “good planning 
practices” per se do not constitute an antidote to the status quo and can even 
accentuate the conflicts they are supposed to minimize – what Dumper (1997) 
called the “central paradox” of planning in the city (see also Bollens, 2000: 12).  
Acknowledging partisanship, however, does not necessarily mean 
subscribing the idea that the relation between planning and politics is 
hierarchical. The line between planning and politics is openly and constantly 
blurred in Jerusalem, so that in a sense it is paradoxical to frame the relation 
between the two in terms of a clear-cut hierarchy. Dumper’s (1997) paradox 
represents a first, implicit acknowledgement of the fact that the very idea of 
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“good planning practices” – collecting detailed, first-hand knowledge of the 
urban environment, adopting sophisticate technical tools, involving the 
stakeholders, and so forth – should be problematized by contextualizing and 
historicizing our exploration of the planning process. Empirically, the impact of 
planners on major urban issues should not be measured against the yardstick of 
a planning handbook, but rather in a more holistic manner: to this purpose, 
planners should be considered as full-fledged actors, who participate to the 
policy process by virtue of their professional status, but whose role is not 
necessarily limited to a technical contribution. 
Jerusalem offers multiple examples of how planning and political 
arguments might overlap, and how planners’ agency might surface in unexpected 
ways. To be sure, Jerusalemite planners face issues that go well beyond the 
narrow realm of planning and of their professional skills and training. Crucially, 
however, planners’ inclusion in the policy process involves instead practical 
judgments and a strategic use of their professional knowledge and status 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998b; Wagenaar, 2004) in the planning process itself. As David Best 
(one of the main planners working in East Jerusalem after 1967) notes, working 
as a planner does not simply entail the mobilization of technical knowledge, but 
rather the display of a wider range of skills including lobbying, creating and 
maintaining access to influent individuals and institutions, manipulating clients 
and public opinion. (Forester et al., 2001: 57-64). In Best’s words, the planner 
should “try to get people to believe that they have arrived at conclusions which 
they feel is right [...]. It’s a question of psychology, backed up by a lot of 
information and knowledge” (ibid, pp. 61-63). The description by Thomas 
Leitersdorf, the chief architect of the team in charge to plan Ma’ale Adumim, of 
the meeting during which the final location of the settlement was chosen, offers 
the occasion to reflect on these dynamics. 
 
When we put the alternatives to the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, [the body 
charged with the approval of the establishment of new settlements] headed at the time by Ariel 
Sharon, the only questions asked were: “Which of the alternative locations has better control 
over the main routes?’ And ‘which town has a better chance to grow quickly and offer qualities 
that would make it competitive with Jerusalem?” I replied that according to these criteria the 
ideal location would be location A [the present site of Ma’ale Adumim] […]. At that moment 
Sharon rose and declared, without consulting the Committee, that “the State of Israel decides on 
location A” (Tamir-Tawil, 2003: 153-154). 
 
On the surface, this vignette seems to a straightforward case of top-down, 
politico-strategic decision-making. The notorious “hawk”, the Likud member 
Ariel Sharon (who later on served as prime minister of Israel) is apparently the 
only relevant player on the scene: the planner’s subordinate position is clear as 
he limits himself to answer the politician’s specific questions – the rest of the 
committee is simply silent. However, if we dig under this surface, the picture 
reveals a hidden complexity. First, the (four) locations on which Sharon was 
asking the planner’s opinion had been previously selected by another planning 
team more than a year before, during the last months of Yitzhak Rabin’s first 
tenure as prime minister – Sharon himself therefore acted, at least to a certain 
extent, within the boundaries determined by planners. Second, interviews with 
members of the Ma’ale Adumim planning team reveals that they wanted to 
change the location of the settlement to location A before the meeting of the 
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Committee [D, H, interviews, November 2010, February 2010; see also Tamir-
Tawil, 2003: 153]. This means that Sharon, by interrogating planners’ 
(supposedly) neutral expertise, ended up choosing the location that the planners 
had already selected as the best possible option. What is important here is not so 
much the planner’ motivations for choosing location A, or the possible conflicts 
between the politician and the planner, but rather the appreciation of the fact 
that the decision-making landscape is significantly more blurred than a 
superficial understanding of the planning/politics nexus would assume – and 
that planners, like any other actor, can exert their influence on the planning 
process by strategically interpreting the dynamics of decision-making. 
To relate to the distinction introduced earlier between “politics in 
planning” and “politics of planning”, planners operate both as “post-empiricist 
experts” (Fischer, 2009) contributing to the policy process through their mastery 
of technical knowledge and their ability as mediators, and as agents of political 
mobilization in the broader context of a given urban reality. Mainstream 
planners might wish for an environment where their professional lives are made 
easier by the relaxation of political tensions, and where urban issues are treated 
following planning handbooks more closely. This does not mean, however, that 
planning and political arguments are invariably at war. As one of our 
respondents notes, technical arguments could be mobilized in support of the 
construction of suburban settlements like Ma’ale Adumim, alleviating the 
demographic pressure on the overcrowded city of Jerusalem [H, interview, 
February 2010]. Furthermore, planners do have political worldviews, which 
sometime harmonize with decisions taken by politicians; this is the case, for 
example, of the period immediately following the reunification of Jerusalem – in 
Israel Kimhi’s words, “a glorious time” for Israeli planners (Bollens, 2000: 109) 
given the once in a lifetime opportunity of re-configuring Jerusalem’ from a split 
city into one urban core.  
The case of activist planners offers us yet another example in this respect. 
As two Israeli researchers observe in their study of Bimkom’s deliberative 
planning initiative in Isawiya, “Had we chosen to measure Bimkom's planning 
process against any ideal model of deliberative planning, we would have to deem 
it a failure” (Ron & Cohen-Blankshtain, 2011: 646), because of the political 
limitations inherent in the development of the process and, ultimately, the 
impossibility of getting any plan approved by hostile local planning commissions. 
Still, precisely because the chances achieving tangible results through the 
planning system remain very low, political mobilization becomes the ultimate 
goal of planning practices. Deliberative planning practice can be understood “as 
a form of political representation that competes with other forms of 
representation” (Ron and Cohen-Blankshtain, 2011: 637). As an architect and 
planner working for Bimkom notes with respect to a petition against house 
demolitions in Palestinian neighbourhoods, “We don’t believe that our petition 
[…] will stop demolitions, but we want to raise awareness” [I, interview, 
February 2010]. It might well be true, as Alfasi (2003) and Martens (2005) have 
argued in relation to the Israeli case, that participatory practices do not 
necessarily make the planning process more democratic if more structural 
reforms of the planning system are not implemented. However, the practices of 
activist planners also function quite clearly as a vehicle for addressing urban 
issues in a broader, holistic way (Yacobi, 2007).  
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As such, activists’ deliberative planning practices (although partial and 
most likely doomed to failure) hold value in their promotion of a more 
democratic approach to planning even in such contested cities as Jerusalem (El-
Atrash, 2015: 50). In this respect, the case of Jerusalem is also instructive to the 
extent that it shows that planning initiatives can sometimes have an impact in 
their challenges to dominant approaches. First, and most obviously, from time to 
time plans initiated by activist planners or Palestinian residents unexpectedly 
make it through the Israeli planning commissions. The case studies examined in 
the recently released UN-Habitat report on Jerusalem (El-Atrash, 2015) presents 
some examples in this respect. Even more surprising has been the recent 
approval by the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee of a plan for 
the construction of 2,500 housing units in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Jabal 
Mukaber, initiated by Israeli Palestinian architect Senan Abdelqader on behalf of 
the residents (Hasson, 2015). Needless to say, many doubts remain about the 
future implementation of this project. Also, a more detailed analysis of the plan 
would be needed to assess how many of the 2,500 planned housing units 
represent new construction, rather than the ex-post approval of existing 
buildings.  
Second, individual, uncoordinated planning initiatives can incrementally 
create the conditions for broader political changes. As Braier (2013) has argued 
in her study of Jabal Mukaber, where several NGOs have been especially active in 
the last fifteen years, independent zoning plans submitted by Palestinians to 
Israeli commissions represent a form of “quiet encroachment” (Bayat, 2013) – 
or, as James Holston (2008) would put it, “insurgent planning” – see also 
Sandercock (1998). In other words, these initiatives – small-scale plans 
submitted by individual residents in order to protect their properties from the 
threat of demolition or to allow for small improvements – are not born out of a 
political opposition to the system nor do they offer a comprehensive planning 
alternative to major urban issues; nevertheless, the cumulative nature of these 
efforts constitutes an inherent challenge to Israeli sovereignty as expressed in 
local planning policies. 
  
5. Conclusion  
 
As far as the relation between planning and politics is concerned, Jerusalem 
represents a rather exceptional case study. However, we argue that the 
examination of such an extraordinary case study can offer some suggestions on 
how to conceptualize the relation between planning, conflicts, and power. At the 
same time, it makes the case for a more nuanced, and non-hierarchical 
understanding of the planning/politics nexus. 
 In the first place, Jerusalem offers a stark reminder of how urban and 
planning issues are more broadly political and social issues – it represents an 
“extreme case” in this respect. This is where communicative scholars’ emphasis 
on planning as a set of procedures to deal with politics (or with “politics in 
planning”) falls short of connecting the internal dynamics of the planning 
process with broader socio-political realities (the “politics of planning”). This is 
also the case for any other procedural definition of “good planning practices”, 
irrespective of whether “good” is understood in terms of planning possessing 
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inherently progressive potential in delivering rational/efficient solutions, or in a 
more democratic/participative fashion.  
The problem is not only that, in Jerusalem, mediators who “stand in 
connection to all sides for justice’s sake”, (Forester, 2009: 5) or power-savvy 
deliberative practitioners (Forester, 1999) cannot be found anywhere because of 
the polarized atmosphere of the city, but rather that the planners’ agency can 
only be assessed in relation to the socio-political environment in which they 
operate. It is in this respect that Jerusalem represents a “critical case”. The 
acknowledgement of the deep politicization of planning issues in Jerusalem does 
not simply restrict the role of planners either to irrelevance or complicity: 
rather, it offers us the appropriate yardstick for assessing their agency. Planners’ 
agency should not be judged simply by “how much planning” they can inject into 
urban development, but by their more general contribution to the policy process. 
The case of Jerusalem, demonstrates that even in such a polarized environment, 
planners’ agency can surface in many different ways, inside and outside the 
institutional boundaries of the planning process. 
 
 
 
Appendix – List of interviewees 
 
A -  Director, Jerusalem Municipality Planning Department, Jerusalem, May 
2013.   
B -  Senior urban planner, Jerusalem Municipality Planning Department, 
Jerusalem, June 2013. 
C -  Former Deputy Mayor (East Jerusalem portfolio), Jerusalem, November 
2010.  
D -  Chief Architect, Ma’ale Adumim Planning Team, Tel Aviv, November 2010. 
E -  Head, Jerusalem District Office - Ministry of Housing, Jerusalem, 
November 2010. 
F -  Senior Researcher, Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies and Former 
Jerusalem Municipality City Planner, Jerusalem, November 2010.  
G -  Researcher, Bimkom, Tel Aviv, February 2010   
H -  Former City Engineer Jerusalem and current activist planner, Tel Aviv, 
February 2010. 
I -  Planner, Bimkom, Jerusalem, February 2010 and July 2012.  
J -  Planner, Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, Jerusalem, February 2010. 
K -  City Engineer, Ma’ale Adumim, Ma’ale Adumim, November 2010. 
L -  Planner, Bimkom, Jerusalem, February 2010. 
M -  Head, Program Implementation Department – Ministry of Housing, 
Jerusalem, November 2011. 
N -  Planner, IPCC, Jerusalem, November 2010. 
O -  Planner, private consultant, Former Deputy Director General for the Israel 
Government Tourist Corporation and Director of Planning Department at 
the Jerusalem Municipality, Jerusalem, May 2012. 
 
 
* Greater Jerusalem Map (Figure 1) created by Sadaf Sultan Khan 
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Figure 1: Greater Jerusalem Map*, reproducing the Jerusalem Regional TAMAM 30/1 Masterplan and Ma’ale 
Adumim Masterplan.  
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